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ABSTRACT 
 In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory 
of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly norma-
tive. His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting robust 
markets. This Article compares and contrasts Oman’s argument 
about the proper understanding of contract law with one presented 
over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen. Oman’s focus is on the 
connection between Contract Law and markets; Cohen’s connection 
had been between Contract Law and the public interest. Oman’s 
work brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete 
form, as a formidable normative theory with detailed prescriptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory 
of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly nor-
mative.1 His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting 
robust markets.2 This Article compares and contrasts Oman’s 
argument about the proper understanding of contract law with 
one presented over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen, another 
theory that focused on what contract law should do for us. 
 Part I summarizes Cohen’s argument. Part II compares 
Oman’s analysis with Cohen’s, to see where the newer work im-
proves on the older, and where the older work might still have 
some advantages. 
I. MORRIS COHEN’S “BASIS OF CONTRACT” 
 
 In 1933, Morris Cohen published “The Basis of Contract” 
in the Harvard Law Review.3 Cohen’s article is a nice match to 
Oman’s book, in scope, ambition, and learning. Cohen’s purpose 
was to investigate the “nature of contract” in the light of moral 
philosophy, general social philosophy, political theory, and eco-
nomics.4 As in Oman’s book, the text travels among both histori-
cal lands and historians (Maine, Maitland, and Montesquieu; and 
Homeric Greece, Biblical Israel, and medieval Italy, just to name 
a few).5 From the historical survey, the author draws two conclu-
sions: (1) that Maine’s famous observation that law moves from 
status to contract is “partly true in certain periods of expanding 
trade;”6 and (2) “[a]t no times does a community completely abdi-
cate its right to limit and regulate the effect of private agreements, 
a right that it must exercise to safeguard what it regards as the 
interest of all its members.”7 In the course of his analysis, Cohen 
also touches on the theme Oman will emphasize at much greater 
                                                                                                            
1 NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (2016) [hereinafter OMAN, DIGNITY]. 
2 Id. 
3 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933). 
4 Id. at 553. 
5 Id. at 554–58, 574–75. 
6 Id. at 558. 
7 Id. at 558 (emphasis in original). 
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length: that commerce and international trade are central to the 
“expansion of the régime of contract.”8 
 In the course of his analysis, Cohen considered a promi-
nent theory of contract that corresponds to the autonomy theory 
that Oman considers and rejects:9 the will theory of contracts.10 
In the United States (unlike Continental Europe),11 the will the-
ory of contracts had become enmeshed with the partly economic, 
partly political theory of laissez-faire.12 So, the article argues on 
two fronts, against both the will theory13 and laissez-faire.14 As to 
the latter, Cohen found a troubling inconsistency in the advo-
cates of non-intervention: “[t]he same group ... that protests against 
a child labor law, or against any minimum wage law ... is con-
stantly urging the government to protect industry by tariffs.”15 
Another older variant of a recent theory of Contract Law appears in 
Cohen’s critique of reliance theories of Contract Law.16 
 In the context of his discussion of laissez-faire approaches to 
Contract Law, Cohen rejected John Stuart Mill’s drawing of a sharp 
line between self-regarding actions and other-regarding actions: 
“[w]hat act of any individual does not affect others?”17 This in 
turn leads to what is, arguably, the central point of Cohen’s article: 
A contract ... between two or more individuals cannot be said 
to be generally devoid of all public interest. If it be of no inter-
est, why enforce it? For note that in enforcing contracts, the 
government does not merely allow two individuals to do what they 
have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement ... puts the 
                                                                                                            
8 Id. at 557. 
9 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 8–9; cf. Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Re-
taliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
529 (2011) (arguing for superiority of a civil recourse approach to contract law 
over autonomy-based approaches). 
10 See generally Cohen, supra note 3, at 558–62, 575–78; JAMES GORDLEY, 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 161–229 (1991) 
(discussing the will theory). 
11 See GORDLEY, supra note 10, at 161–229. 
12 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 558–62. 
13 Id. at 575–78. 
14 Id. at 560, 562. 
15 Id. at 561–62. 
16 See id. at 578–80. For modern versions of the reliance theory, see GRANT 
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61–63 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995), & 
P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 87 (Repr., with a new chapter, 1990). 
17 Cohen, supra note 3, at 562. 
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machinery of the law in the service of one party against the 
other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be done 
are important questions of public policy. ... [T]he notion that in 
enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of 
the parties rests upon an utterly untenable theory as to what 
the enforcement of contracts involves.18 
 After a circuit of other theories of Contract Law prominent 
in his day, Cohen returns to his main theme: “[i]f ... the law of 
contract confers sovereignty on one party over another (by put-
ting the state’s forces at the disposal of the former) ... [f]or what 
purposes and under what circumstances shall that power be 
conferred?”19 Sometimes, he considered, limits on available terms 
(e.g., usury laws and non-enforcement of unconscionable terms) 
or mandatory terms may be what public policy requires.20 
 Cohen’s ultimate conclusion is straightforward: the provi-
sion of courts and other enforcement machinery to respond to 
breaches of contract is an expensive resource.21 It is reasonable 
that the state should only provide this resource where enforcement 
of contracts serves the public interest and withhold this resource 
for those particular contracts, or categories of contracts, where 
enforcement would not serve the public interest.22 The question 
of social good is foundational under this analysis. Echoing—though 
not citing—David Hume, Cohen argues that the only reason we 
have to keep promises and agreements earlier made is “some 
social good or necessity that is served.”23 
 Both the weakness and the strength of Cohen’s argument is 
its flexibility. “Enforce what serves the common good” seems as 
uncontroversial, and as helpful to practical judgment as the pre-
scription “be fair” and “do justice”24 (or, for that matter, Aquinas’s 
                                                                                                            
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 587. 
20 Id. at 587–88. 
21 Id. at 586–87. 
22 Id. at 587. 
23 Id. at 571; cf. David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1752), reprinted in 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 49–51 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s4.html [https://perma 
.cc/P9TV-RYET] (arguing that the legitimacy of “social contracts,” like the moral 
obligation to keep promises or contracts generally, is ultimately grounded on 
whether they serve the general welfare). 
24 Cohen, supra note 3, at 571. 
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prescription “that good should be done and sought and evil is to 
be avoided”).25 We want to know what types of agreements do 
serve the public interest, and thus warrant enforcement, and we 
would prefer, to the extent possible, to know this in advance to give 
greater predictability (and consistency) to enforcement decisions.26 
Cohen does not deny or disregard this.27 In the course of an arti-
cle that already deals (briskly) with a large number of topics and 
approaches, Cohen is more than willing to share his views about 
government regulation in general, minimum wages, usury laws, 
mandatory terms in employment and insurance contracts, and 
many other topics.28 By way of summation, he adds: “[f]or our 
present purpose it is sufficient to note that the law of contract in 
thus dealing with public policies cannot be independent of general 
political theory.”29 
II.  THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 
A. Overview 
 Oman’s argument in The Dignity of Commerce is, essen-
tially, a market theory of contract.30 He declares: “well-functioning 
markets are morally desirable, and contract law should be orga-
nized to support such markets.”31 That is, contracts should be 
enforced when they support (well-functioning, non-pernicious) mar-
kets, and not enforced when they do not.32 
 Markets are valuable, Oman argues, because they produce 
prosperity, encourage “peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic society 
and inculcate certain moral virtues.”33 While Oman finds indica-
tions of connections between contract law and markets in some of 
the American legal realists’ work,34 in aspects of law and economics 
                                                                                                            
25 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I–II, Question 94, art. 2, corpus, 
in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 247 (R. J. Henle ed., 1993). 
26 Cohen, supra note 3, at 587–88. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 561–62, 587–88. 
29 Id. at 588. 
30 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 1, 183–84. 
31 Id. at 1. 
32 Id. at 16–17, 160–61. 
33 Id. at 16. 
34 Id. at 13–14. 
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scholarship,35 and in some other contemporary Contract Law theo-
ries,36 he concludes that none of the Contract Law theories make 
markets sufficiently central.37 
 Anglo-American contract law predates the rise of modern 
markets—though, of course, commercial exchange has been around 
longer still, there is no reason to think that the enforcement of 
promises or exchanges predates it.38 Of course, Oman, well-read in 
the history of Contract Law, recognizes this. He observes that 
“[n]othing as complicated and as historically contingent as the com-
mon law of contracts can be said to have a simple origin or repre-
sent a single normative concern over the centuries of its history.”39 
B. Two Case Examples 
 For all the strengths of Oman’s analysis, I would have 
preferred more attention to have been paid to the value of being 
able to give a legally enforceable commitment. Consider the case 
of Webb v. McGowin,40 which Oman briefly discusses.41 In an inci-
dent at a workplace, Joe Webb saved his boss, J. Greeley McGowin, 
from serious injury or death, by diverting a large falling block, 
but in the process suffered severe injuries himself.42 McGowin 
subsequently promised to pay Webb a certain amount every two 
weeks until Webb died.43 McGowin did so until his own death, but 
then McGowin’s executors ceased the payments.44 Webb sued, and 
ultimately prevailed.45 However, the court had to go through 
some analytical gymnastics to get to its result: comparing the 
outcome to restitutionary recovery for rescued livestock, and apply-
ing a presumption that McGowin’s post-accident promise to pay 
Webb “rais[e] the presumption that the services had been rendered 
                                                                                                            
35 Id. at 11–12. 
36 See id. at 10–11 (discussing the work of Daniel Markovits). 
37 Id. at 15. 
38 Id. at 5–8. 
39 Id. at 8. 
40 168 So. 196, 196 (Ala. App. 1936). 
41 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108. 
42 Webb, 168 So. at 197. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 197. 
45 Id. at 199. 
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at McGowin’s request”46—that is, a presumption that McGowin 
somehow negotiated the payment for the rescue while the large 
block was falling.47 This is obviously factually absurd, but perhaps 
a paradigmatic use of a legal fiction48 to get the court to where it 
wanted to go: enforcement of the promise despite the failure to meet 
the consideration requirement (consideration will enforce a promise 
given in exchange for a future action, but not a promise given in 
response to a past action).49 
 Oman states that the promise in Webb was rightly enforced, 
“because it was made in the context of a healthy market, and its 
enforcement will serve to strengthen the trust within that mar-
ket.”50 It is true that the saving of the life occurred between an 
employee and an employer, but it was hardly the normal com-
mercial aspects of the employment relationship.51 The trust that 
was being increased was the trust that a promise made by a 
beneficiary would be kept.52 
 The beneficiary of the altruistic act kept the promise 
throughout his lifetime; the problem came only after his death, 
when the executor of the estate refused to continue the payments.53 
On this matter (and this is a sentence I did not foresee ever hav-
ing to use), Richard Posner’s analysis is better than Oman’s. Posner 
writes, regarding Webb: 
The rescued person promised to pay his rescuer $15 every two 
weeks for the rest of the rescuer’s life. This was a generous gift 
to the extent that the promise was enforceable but a much less 
generous one to the extent that it was not. Had the promisor 
believed that such a promise was unenforceable, he might have 
decided instead to make a one-time transfer that might have 
had a much lower present value than had the annuity which 
he in fact promised. Both parties would have been worse off 
                                                                                                            
46 Id. at 198. 
47 See id. at 198. 
48 See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). 
49 Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 
78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1992) (“As is so often said, past consideration is no 
consideration.”). 
50 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108. 
51 See Webb, 168 So. at 196. 
52 See OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108. 
53 Id. 
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by this alternative. Hence, it is not surprising that the court 
held the promise to be enforceable.54 
 One possible objection to the outcome in Webb55 is that 
enforcing promises of this sort requires an exception to (or, if one 
prefers, a supplement to) the requirement of consideration. This 
objection need not detain us long, for two reasons.56 First, cur-
rent doctrine has already established an exception for cases of this 
sort, and it is widely accepted.57 Second, Oman himself argues for 
creating exceptions to the consideration requirement where it 
serves the larger purpose (in his view, supporting markets).58 
 In the same chapter as the discussion of Webb, Oman de-
fends the enforcement of promises for pensions (regardless of 
reliance), on the grounds that such promises are “in a commercial 
context in furtherance of economic activity.”59 Certainly, a pen-
sion for a worker is more clearly a “commercial context”60 than is 
compensation for a good deed occurring during a workplace acci-
dent,61 but when the payment is made after the employment is 
over (rather than as part of the initial employment package, or 
as an incentive to get an employee to retire early), it looks more 
like an act of altruism or the response to a moral obligation. 
 Oman is emphatic in rejecting the position proffered here 
(or something like it): “[w]e should not enforce contracts simply 
because people desire to impose legal obligations on themselves 
and a respect for personal autonomy requires that we accede to 
their wishes.”62 Throughout Oman’s extended discussion, it is 
not clear why we should not.63 We are told, persuasively, that a 
valuable use of Contract Law is the support of (good) markets.64 
We are told, reasonably, though perhaps not (yet) indubitably, 
                                                                                                            
54 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 411, 419 (1977). 
55 See Webb, 168 So. at 198. 
56 See infra text accompanying notes 56–58. 
57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
58 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
59 Id. at 106. 
60 Id. 
61 See Webb, 168 So. at 198. 
62 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 180. 
63 See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
64 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 16. 
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that this is the most important or most central use of or value 
for Contract Law.65 Even granting both claims, it is not clear why 
Contract Law should not also serve the purpose of allowing indi-
viduals to make legally enforceable commitments, even if those com-
mitments are not directly connected to well-functioning markets. 
 Perhaps the concern is that if Contract Law tries to serve 
the interests individuals might have outside the commercial con-
text, it will undermine the force or effectiveness of the doctrinal 
area’s service of well-functioning markets. There is some plausi-
bility to this, in that resources or attention taken away from sup-
porting markets might dilute the message and confuse contracting 
parties.66 There might, of course, also be the occasional case where 
the interest in supporting well-functioning markets (and not 
supporting pathological markets) conflicts with the interest of 
individuals in being able to impose legally enforceable obliga-
tions on themselves.67 
 Oman’s response to another canonical case, Hamer v. 
Sidway,68 may be instructive here. Hamer is the case where the 
uncle promised to pay his nephew a large sum of money if the 
nephew gave up a bunch of fun (immoral) activities for a period 
of time.69 At trial, the objection to enforcement had been that the 
nephew had not provided consideration, because in giving up those 
activities he was benefitting himself.70 The court, rejecting this ar-
gument, held that any giving up of a legal liberty was sufficient for 
consideration; there was no need to show an objective detriment.71 
 Oman discusses this case in the context of his proposed 
rule that “the law should presumptively enforce all agreements 
made in furtherance of commercial activity.”72 He concludes that 
though the agreement was “not made in furtherance of a com-
mercial transaction and was not made in an established market,” 
                                                                                                            
65 See id. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 62–65. 
67 See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) 
(involving the validity of an arbitration agreement between a credit cardholder 
and a bank). 
68 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
69 Id. at 256. 
70 Id. at 257. 
71 Id. at 259. 
72 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 102. 
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it should be enforced, because it was a bargain (exchange), and en-
forcing exchanges might “assist in the generation of new markets.”73 
 Now, it is true that there might be an emerging market in 
payments for self-deprivation—though, on the whole, it is not likely. 
It is also true that allowing parties to make legally enforceable 
commitments can be valuable, including for uncles who want to 
give nephews incentives to change their ways (incentives that will 
be significantly greater if they can be enforced in court).74 However, 
it is equally true—and a simpler point—that both parties benefit in 
such cases from an ability to make legally enforceable agreements. 
C. Variety of and Within Contract Law 
 Oman’s approach places commerce front and center. Prom-
ises and agreements related to markets are to be enforced, un-
less the market is pathological.75 Agreements not clearly connected 
to well-functioning markets are also to be enforced, but apparently 
only because enforcement might help to develop new well-function-
ing markets.76 While I have no objection to an extra focus on 
markets, and special rules to help to support them, I do have 
qualms, as already noted, about the express and implied message 
that promises and agreements unrelated to markets are of no 
value (beyond their connection to possible future markets) and 
should not be enforced. 
 One might wonder whether the single focus, or single fix-
ation, of the Commerce Theory may be partly a product of the 
distinctive way American Contract Law operates. In many other 
jurisdictions and contexts, as well as much scholarly commentary, 
Contract Law is divided up according to the parties involved.77 
                                                                                                            
73 Id. at 103. 
74 See Hamer, 27 N.E. at 256. 
75 See generally OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1. Oman is not the first to this 
prescription. Cohen describes Roscoe Pound as similarly arguing that “all promises 
in the course of business should be enforced.” Cohen, supra note 3, at 573 (citing 
ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236, 276 (1922)). 
76 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 103. 
77 Martijn W. Hesselink, Towards a Sharp Distinction Between B2B and 
B2C?: On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract Law After the Consumer 
Rights Directive 9–10 (Ctr. for Study of Eur. Contract L., Working Paper Series 
No. 2009/06, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416126 
[https://perma.cc/8A39-4XN6]. 
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For European Contract Law, business-to-consumer (B2C) trans-
actions are subject to different rules and principles than busi-
ness-to-business (B2B) transactions.78 American law does have 
some statutory protections for consumers, but these tend to be 
marginal in their effects, and it is significant that such laws are 
generally not discussed at length in Contract Law courses (or in 
the Restatements of Contract Law).79 
 The primary law for international sale of goods, the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG, or Vienna Convention), does not apply to B2C trans-
actions at all.80 By contrast, Article 2 of the American Uniform 
Commercial Code applies whether the sale of goods is B2B or 
B2C81 (though there are some provisions that apply in different 
ways if one or both parties are merchants).82 
 On the scholarly side, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott 
published an influential article suggesting the B2B contracts should 
be interpreted under different principles than non-B2B contracts 
(a more textualist approach for B2B). Schwartz and Scott sug-
gest B2B contracts should be treated differently in part because 
of the different levels of sophistication when both parties are busi-
nesspeople, and in part because of the lesser concern for “autonomy” 
interests when the parties are both businesses.83 
 There are a number of different axes along which one might 
emphasize the variety within Contract Law: whether by the nature 
of the parties (B2B, B2C, and where both parties are not business 
entities), the general nature of the transaction (e.g., the way Ameri-
can law has distinctly different rule systems for sale of goods as 
against non-sale of goods (services)), the transaction types (e.g., 
lease, employment contract, insurance, sale of real estate, mortgage, 
                                                                                                            
78 Id. 
79 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on 
Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575 (1989) (discuss-
ing the lack of attention to consumer protection statutes in the contract law 
literature and the modest effect of such statutes in practice). 
80 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 art. 2(a). 
81 U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
82 See, e.g., id. § 2-205 (regarding firm offers); § 2-207(b) (relating to battle 
of the forms). 
83 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45, 556 (2003). 
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etc.—all of which have some distinctive rules or principles),84 and 
whether the agreement should be understood as “relational” or 
“short-term”/“one-shot.”85 Not all legal systems make all of these 
distinctions, or have rules and principles that vary significantly 
across each of these dividing lines, but all the legal systems and 
codes with which I am aware make many such distinctions.86 
 One question the variety of types, rules, and principles 
within Contract Law raises is the tenability or wisdom of universal 
theories for this area.87 That is not the topic here. The related theme 
relevant here is the idea that Contract Law has many facets, a 
fact that in turn makes it easier, perhaps, to recognize that it serves 
multiple interests, and different values (which may often overlap, 
but occasionally conflict). 
 I do not mean such references as opposition to or rebuttal 
of Oman’s position. To the contrary, they are meant to be sup-
portive, to be a friendly amendment.88 Consider an example, what 
is likely one of the more controversial parts of the book’s argu-
ment.89 Oman offers a provocative response in The Dignity of 
Commerce to the problem of boilerplate terms in standard form 
and online contracts.90 Many commentators and some courts have 
worried about the absence of meaningful consent by consumers and 
employees to terms in their agreements.91 While most courts 
ultimately enforce these provisions, despite concerns about con-
sent,92 there is a steady stream of courts refusing enforcement.93 
                                                                                                            
84 See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DE-
CIDING APPEALS 121–57 (Little, Brown & Co., 1960) (discussing a variety of 
transaction types). 
85 Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical 
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 749, 757–58 (2000). 
86 See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, Law Making in the European Union: On Global-
ization and Contract Law in Divergent Legal Cultures, 67 LA. L. REV. 1181, 
1182, 1184 (2007). 
87 See Brian H. Bix, The Promise and Problems of Universal, General The-
ories of Contract Law, 30 RATIO JURIS 391 (2017). 
88 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 90. 
89 Id. at 156. 
90 Id. 
91 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity 
and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006). 
92 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) 
(enforcing terms from a form contract). 
93 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159 
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding a boilerplate arbitration clause to be unconscionable). 
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 Under Oman’s analysis, minimal consent (one party provid-
ing terms to the second in some form or another, and the second 
party’s having expressed assent in some form) is a sufficient 
safeguard for most purposes, and the court’s being on guard against 
“pathological markets” should be a sufficient supplement.94 Ex-
pecting or demanding consent in any more robust form is unre-
alistic, and when the objective of Contract Law is the support of 
well-functioning markets, a focus on consent is simply misplaced.95 
 The implied cost-benefit calculation regarding the required 
level of consent is likely correct for transactions between busi-
nesses and consumers and between businesses and employees.96 
However, it is less clear that consent need be ignored or discounted 
in contexts where mass production of forms is less common, as in 
non-commercial agreements, or even in agreements between so-
phisticated business parties.97 This option might be more salient 
in a less monistic theory, one more attentive to the variety of 
contexts, uses, and objectives of agreements and promises.98 
D. Oman and Cohen 
 There is a sense in which the approach in Oman’s book 
can be seen as a development of the basic idea of Cohen’s article.99 
Oman accepts that Contract Law should serve the best interests 
of society, and believes that the best way (and the most natural 
way) for this to happen is by tying the rules of enforcement, per-
formance, and remedies to the service of encouraging well-function-
ing markets.100 On the whole, Oman is significantly more skeptical 
                                                                                                            
94 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 33–59. 
95 Id. at 17. 
96 I made a similar argument in Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF 
CONSENT 251, 264–65 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., Oxford, 2010). 
97 Though with business-to-business agreements, the concern may end up 
being terms that neither party understood, because they are standard provi-
sions mindlessly repeated whose original meaning has been lost long before. 
See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem 
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of government regulation than Cohen had been, though he is more 
open-minded on the topic than the business groups Cohen criti-
cizes in his work.101 By a focus on supporting well-functioning 
markets, and avoiding any support of pathological markets, Oman 
gives clearer normative guidance as to how to clarify some vague 
standards in Contract Law, and where some rules should probably 
be changed.102 As has been discussed, there remain places where 
one might question Oman’s prescriptions, and there are also rea-
sons for preferring a more pluralistic understanding of Contract 
Law’s role.103 Still, Oman’s work can easily be seen as one that 
takes Cohen’s view seriously, and tries to offer a distinct version of 
what it would mean for Contract Law to serve the common good.104 
CONCLUSION 
 Nathan Oman rightly comments, early and often in The 
Dignity of Commerce, that it is surprising that his seems to be 
the first theory of Contract Law that is centered on the mar-
ket.105 Yet, if Oman’s approach is novel—and the novelty itself is 
indeed noteworthy, as the book’s approach emphasizes what should 
have been obvious to us long ago—there are still some predeces-
sors to be found in earlier works.106 This is to be expected; schol-
arship is rarely entirely new (in many areas of philosophy, it is 
commonly claimed that any allegedly new idea can in fact be 
found in some form in Plato, Aristotle, or Aquinas).107 Oman 
himself notes some predecessors among the American legal real-
ists,108 and Morris Cohen was of that era, and his work reflects 
its influence.109 
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 Just as a connection between Contract Law and markets is 
straightforward, yet perhaps ignored because it is so obvious, 
Morris Cohen’s connection in his earlier article between Contract 
Law and the public interest seems equally obvious, and perhaps 
ignored in a similar way because of its salience.110 Oman’s work 
brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete form 
as a formidable normative theory, with detailed prescriptions.111 
Even if one does not agree with all aspects of the approach, it is 
clearly an important step forward. 
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